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Abstract
I estimate the e¤ect of shocks to subjective mortality hazards on consumption
expenditures of retired individuals using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Re-
tirement in Europe. I measure mortality expectations with survey responses on
survival probabilities. To create plausibly exogenous variation in mortality hazard,
I use the death of a sibling as an instrument. My results show that survey responses
contain economically relevant information about longevity expectations, and con-
rm the predictions of life-cycle theories about the e¤ect of these expectations on
intertemporal choice.
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1 Introduction
Life expectancy at older ages is increasing. Increasing longevity has important conse-
quences on the consumption and saving decisions of elderly people. The standard life-
cycle model with mortality risk implies that if peoples longevity expectations change
then their optimal level of consumption also changes.
In this paper I analyse the adjustment of consumption expenditures of elderly people
following changes in their subjective longevity. In particular, I analyse whether consump-
tion is adjusted after a mortality hazard shock, and if this adjustment is in line with the
implications of the life-cycle model. The paper is related to empirical works which analyse
consumption and saving proles based on life-cycle models with mortality risk, and to
the literature on applying subjective probability data in empirical economic models. The
paper contributes to the understanding of consumption behavior at older ages, and also
to the application of subjective expectations data in empirical economic models.
I build a life-cycle model in which life expectancy is stochastic. Based on this model
the ex ante e¤ect of mortality risk on the expected consumption growth is negative:
those who face higher mortality hazard plan lower consumption level for the future and
consume more in the present, provided that credit constraints are not binding. This
result builds on the ndings of Yaari (1965), who was the rst to show that under cer-
tain circumstances lifetime uncertainty can act analogously to increased impatience, and
Hurd (1989), who derives and shows empirically that wealth is negatively responsive to
mortality rates. Another implication of my model is that an upward shock to mortality
hazard a¤ects the consumption level positively: an increase in the hazard implies that it
is optimal to consume more in the present, thus consumption should be adjusted. A nov-
elty of my paper is to test this second implication of the life-cycle model. The individual
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level estimation results provide evidence for the predictions of life-cycle theories about
the e¤ect of subjective mortality hazards on intertemporal choice. A related model of
consumption level is estimated by Skinner (1985a), who estimates positive e¤ect of mor-
tality on consumption. De Nardi et al. (2006) nd that both di¤erential life expectancy
and expected medical expenditures have notable e¤ect on asset accumulation. My paper
contributes to this line of the literature in estimating the e¤ect of shocks to mortality
hazards.
I use the rst two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE) in the empirical analysis. The empirical specications are based on the life-cycle
model. Based on the SHARE data I can use the reported subjective survival probability to
generate a subjective hazard indicator. Survey data was rst used by Hamermesh (1985)
to investigate the determinants of subjective survival probabilities. In line with the nd-
ings of Hamermesh (1985), Hurd and McGarry (1995), and Smith et al. (2001), I also
nd evidence using the SHARE data that subjective life expectancy corresponds to actu-
arial life expectancy, and that subjective probabilities covary with observable risk factors.
My results also conrm that subjective longevity measures can be reasonably used in em-
pirical analyses on economic decisions. This is in line with Manski (2004), who argues for
applying subjective probabilistic data in empirical work. Post and Hanewald (2011) also
use the SHARE data in analyzing subjective survival probabilities, however, they focus
on longevity risk (measured by the dispersion of survival expectations) and its relation
to the wealth level.
To my knowledge, this is the rst paper to estimate the adjustment of consumption
expenditures after a mortality hazard shock on micro level data. Based on studies that use
aggregate data, there is no consensus about the e¤ect of increasing longevity on the aggre-
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gate consumption expenditures and savings (see e.g. Skinner (1985b), Li et al. (2007),
and Tobing (2012)). Using micro level subjective survival data can provide further in-
sights into the e¤ects of changing longevity, as it allows me to identify the e¤ect of
changing longevity. I instrument the change in mortality hazard by the death of a sib-
ling. The instrumenting strategy hinges on the assumption that the death of a sibling
inuences the subjective survival probability, and such an event does not have direct
e¤ect on the consumption expenditures of the elderly people. Robustness tests and data
checks support using the death of a sibling as instrument. Potential endogeneity of the
instrument is assessed by examining the robustness of results to bequest from siblings,
cohabitation with siblings, endogenous changes in surviving sibling preferences, and non-
random attrition.
Gan et al. (2004), Bloom et al. (2007) and Salm (2010) use subjective survival proba-
bilities from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the empirical analysis of life-cycle
models. My main contributions are estimating the e¤ect of changing subjective mortality
hazard on consumption expenditures, and using a novel instrumenting strategy to address
identication concerns. While the basic research question of Gan et al. (2004) is the em-
pirical analysis of bequest motives, they also nd that subjective survival probabilities
can explain the observed consumption and saving decisions better. Bloom et al. (2007)
show that household wealth increases with subjective survival probabilities. They instru-
ment the survival probability with the age or age at death of parents. Using the death of
a sibling as instrument is more appropriate in my empirical analysis than following the
instrumenting strategy of Bloom et al. because of weak instrument and potential endo-
geneity problems. Salm (2010) also investigates the e¤ect of subjective life expectancy on
the consumption and saving decisions of older people, without applying the method of in-
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strumental variables. He also nds that the explanatory power of subjective expectations
on consumption dynamics is higher than that of the statistical life table data.
My empirical results show that those who have positive wealth holdings adjust their
consumption expenditures upwards if their subjective mortality hazard increases. As-
suming that the adjustment of consumption expenditures after increasing and decreasing
mortality hazard is symmetric, the empirical results also indicate that increasing perceived
longevity leads to smaller consumption expenditures, hence to slower wealth decumula-
tion. The reliance of consumption decisions on subjective longevity also implies that full
annuitisation might not be optimal. The estimated ex ante e¤ect of mortality hazard on
consumption dynamics is more sensitive to the empirical specications, but again some
evidence is found for the life-cycle e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I present the life-cycle model
with mortality risk, which provides implications for the empirical analysis. The data and
the variables used are presented in Section 3. The estimation results and potential caveats
are discussed in Section 4. Robustness checks are provided in Section 5, and Section 6
concludes.
2 The life-cycle model of consumption with uncer-
tain lifetime
The purpose of this section is to derive implications for the empirical analysis. Closely
related models are developed by Hurd (1989), Gan et al. (2004) and Salm (2010). The
main novelty of the here presented life-cycle model is that I derive the e¤ect of mortality
hazard shocks on the optimal level of consumption. I present a simple model in which
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there is a single composite consumption good. Income uncertainty, medical expenditures
and bequest motives are neglected. Some extensions of the model are discussed in Section
5.4.
Consumption and income realisations take place at the beginning of each time period,
whereas death can happen at the turning points to new periods. I assume that there are
no credit facilities and income is of annuity type, which are reasonable assumptions for
older, retired individuals.1 As the model explains the consumption decisions of retired
individuals, labour supply decisions are not considered here. The maximisation problem
of individual i is:
max
fCit;t=0:::Tig
E0
TiX
t=0
Iit
tU(Cit)
s.t. Wit = R(Wit 1   Cit 1 + Yi)
0  Wit;8t = 1:::Ti: (1)
Cit is consumption at time t, Yi is income, Wit is wealth,  is the discount factor, and R
is one plus the interest rate. E0 denotes expectations at time 0. Iit is a binary indicator
which equals one if individual i is alive at time t, zero otherwise. The expected value of
this indicator is the subjective survival probability. Ti is the maximum remaining years
of life for individual i. The consumption, wealth, and income variables are conditional
on survival to the given period, otherwise these values are zero. U(Cit) is the utility from
consumption, assumed to be increasing and concave in Cit.
The only uncertainty in the model is mortality risk. Individuals form expectations
on their survival, and these expectations are subject to shocks, thus life expectancy is
1At the aggregate level and in the long run, increasing longevity can a¤ect the income level partly
through intergenerational transfers (see Hock and Weil (2012) for such an analysis).
6
stochastic. I assume that individuals make their expectations on future survival us-
ing all the available information. Using the law of iterated expectations, the expected
value of future survival probability equals the current expectation on the survival, i.e.
E0 (Et(It+kjIt = 1)) = E0(It+kjIt = 1). This implies that only the current survival prob-
abilities matter in the maximisation problem. Based on these considerations, the maxi-
mand of model (1) can be rewritten:
max
fCit;t=0:::Tig
TiX
t=0
E0 (Iit) 
tU(Cit): (2)
Another rationale for this simplication is that It is either 0 or 1. If It = 0 then U(Ct) = 0,
thus only the It = 1 state matters, which occurs with probability E0(It).
Lets assume that the utility of current consumption is of the constant relative risk
aversion form: U(Cit) = C
1 
it =(1 ), where  > 0. Using the law of iterated expectations
and assuming that the credit constraint is not binding give the Euler equation:
Cit = Ci0E0(Iit)
1
 (R)
t
 : (3)
Equation (3) holds only if wealth is not zero, otherwise the consumption equals the
income in every period. The Euler equation reects that a consequence of lifetime uncer-
tainty is that future is discounted to a higher extent. The Euler equation describes the
expected consumption path, conditional on survival. However, the Euler equation per
se cannot reect the e¤ect of changing survival probability on the optimal consumption
path.
The next step is to derive the optimal level of current consumption. I assume that the
expected value of the survival indicator is a power function of the life table survival proba-
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bility. This assumption is equivalent to the hazard-scaling approach of Gan et al. (2005).
Let i0 denote the individual specic index of pessimism at time 0, and S
t+k
t the life ta-
ble survival probability from time t to time t + k: To simplify notations, I denote the
subjective survival probability of individual i from time t to time t + k with st+kit , thus
E0(Iit) = s
t
i0: It follows that s
t
i0 = (S
t
0)
i0. Denoting individual is subjective cumulative
hazard of dying between periods t and t + k with ht+kit , and using the denition that
ln st+kit =  ht+kit , equation (3) can be rewritten:
lnCit+1   lnCit = 1

ln (R)  1

ht+1it =
1

ln (R) +
1

i0 lnS
t+1
t : (4)
No general closed form solution exists for the optimal consumption level, because it
might be optimal to deplete the wealth at some point during the lifetime, and from that
point on the Euler equation does not hold. However, conditional on the time of depletion
(T i  Ti), a closed form solution can be derived for the optimal consumption level. Since
there is no bequest motive, wealth is depleted at time Ti, at the latest: It is optimal not
to deplete the wealth before Ti if the ratio of initial wealth holdings (Wi0) to income
(Yi) is large, and if the expected remaining lifetime of the individual is high (for details
see also Hurd (1989)). T i depends also on the discount and interest factors, and on the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
Using the WiT i = 0 condition gives that
T iX
t=0

 Cit
Rt
+
Yi
Rt

+Wi0 = 0: (5)
I assume that the Euler equation holds exactly until time T i , wealth is depleted with
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consumption CiT  at T i , and from that point on the consumption equals the income.
2
Substituting the Euler equation from equation (3) into equation (5) and using the hazard-
scaling assumption give the expression of optimal current consumption:
Ci0 =
Wi0 + Yi
1 RTi +1
RT

i  RTi +1
T iP
t=0
(St0)
i0
 (R)
t

Rt
: (6)
Based on this expression the partial e¤ect of the pessimism index on the level of initial
consumption is positive, thus the partial e¤ect of subjective hazard is also positive.
My aim is to analyse the e¤ect of unexpected changes in subjective hazard on con-
sumption level. A hazard shock can be represented by a change in the pessimism index
(i). I assume that an upward shock a¤ects the subjective hazard at the beginning of
period one, which is represented by increasing i0 to i1.
3 First I also assume that the
time point of wealth depletion is only marginally a¤ected by the hazard shock, and re-
mains approximately equal to T i . It can be derived using the expression of optimal initial
consumption level (equation (6)) that the optimal consumption level at period one is
Ci1 = RCi0
T iP
t=0
(St0)
i0
 (R)
t

Rt
  1
T iP
t=1
(St1)
i1
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
: (7)
Using that St0 = S
1
0  St1, it follows that the ex post di¤erence between the consumption
2There are two decison variables: Ci0 and T i : Based on the assumption of exact depletion, CiTi = Yi,
and CiTi = Ci0

S
Ti
0
 i0

(R)
Ti
 from the Euler equation. Thus Yi=Ci0 =

S
Ti
0
 i0

(R)
Ti
 , which
shows that given income and initial consumption, T i has to decrease if the mortality hazard increases
(i.e. i0 increases).
3This representation implies that the shock has a permanent e¤ect in the sense that the survival
probabilities to each future periods are a¤ected. If instead only the short run expectations change then
the e¤ect on consumption level has the same sign but smaller magnitude.
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levels of the rst two periods is
lnCi1 lnCi0 = 1

ln (R)  1

h1i0+ln
0@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i0
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
1A ln
0@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i1
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
1A :
(8)
If the credit constraint is not binding then the di¤erenced logarithmic consumption
depends negatively on the initial hazard level, but an upward hazard shock (i1 > i0)
has positive e¤ect on it. This solution is based on the assumption that the hazard shock
does not considerably a¤ect the optimal time point of wealth depletion. If T i is large,
and the hazard shock is moderate then equation (8) can be a good approximation for the
consumption dynamics. In addition, if the ratio of initial wealth to income is high then
T i = Ti is also una¤ected. Otherwise T

i decreases after the upward hazard shock, which
makes the last term in equation (8) even smaller. Thus the expression under equation (8)
can be considered as a lower bound of the ex post di¤erence in the optimal logarithmic
consumption expenditures.4
I apply linear approximation of the di¤erenced logarithmic term in equation (8) at
i0:
ln
0@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i0
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
1A  ln
0@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i1
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
1A t
t
0@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i0
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
1A 10@ T iX
t=1
(St1)
i0
 (R)
t 1

Rt 1
  i1 lnSt1 + i0 lnSt1
1A : (9)
Since  i1 lnSt1 equals the cumulative hazard from period 1 to period t after the hazard
4If wealth is allowed to be depleted before time Ti then the solution of the consumption model can
be found only numerically. Numerical results indicate that the e¤ect of an upward hazard shock on
consumption expenditures is positive, and an upward hazard shock might decrease T i .
The upward shift in the optimal consumption level depends on the parameters in the model. Holding
the income xed, if the wealth level is higher then the optimal consumption level is more sensitive to the
hazard shock. The sensitivity is not a monotone function of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, but
at higher relative wealth holdings the e¤ect of shock decreases with the risk aversion coe¢ cient.
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shock and  i0 lnSt1 equals the cumulative hazard before the hazard shock, substituting
equation (9) to (8) implies that the rst di¤erenced logarithmic consumption depends
positively on the rst di¤erenced mortality hazard.
Motivated by the consumption model of equation (8), and using the approximation
of equation (9), I will estimate two empirical specications:
d lnCi1 = 01 + 11hi0 + 21dhi1 +Xi31 + u1i (10)
d lnCi1 = 02 + 12hi0 + 22Hi +Xi32 + u2i: (11)
Although these specications are based on a set of simplifying assumptions, the joint
inclusion of initial hazard and hazard shock measures correspond to the life-cycle model.
In these models hi0 and hi1 are the one period hazard indicators at time 0 and 1, and
in the second specication Hi is a binary indicator of increasing hazard between periods
0 and 1.5 The vector of Xi includes additional control variables. As a simplication, I
neglect the heterogeneity in the e¤ect of changing hazard. Based on the life-cycle model
the 11 and 12 parameters are negative, whereas the 21 and 22 parameters should be
positive if the credit constraint is not binding. If the credit constraint is binding then
these parameters should be zero. Model (10) is based on the linear approximation of
equation (8), whereas model (11) allows me to test the implication of the life-cycle model
that the consumption expenditures should increase after an upward hazard shock.
The consumption model extended with hazard shocks is comparable to those consump-
tion models in the literature where the consumption di¤erences depend on intertemporal
5Using dhi1 in equation (10) is also a simplication, which can support the interpretability of the
empirical results. Apart from hazard shocks, the hazard increases due to ageing between two dates
of observation, which e¤ect is also included in dhi1, but not in  i1 lnSt1 + i0 lnSt1. The sign of the
estimated e¤ect of changing hazard is robust to this simplication. If the two indicators of changing
hazard are cleared from the e¤ect of ageing then their estimated e¤ects become stronger.
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substitution, and also on changing expectations about future income. The adjustment of
consumption after shifts in permanent income is analysed among others by Flavin (1981)
and Campbell and Deaton (1989). Parker and Preston (2005) decompose consumption
growth into four factors, one of which is the e¤ect of new informations. Here I assume
that the individual income is constant, but analyse the adjustment after changing sub-
jective mortality hazard, which can also be considered as adjustment after the arrival of
new informations.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the rst two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe.6 The SHARE is a cross-national panel database covering
individuals aged at least 50, and their spouses. The rst wave of the data was collected
in year 2004, and the survey is repeated every second year. I include those countries
in the analysis for which both the rst and second wave data are available: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
and Switzerland.
When estimating the consumption models I exclude those respondents who are aged
above 80 in the second wave (around 7% of the sample). The reason for this restriction is
that the subjective mortality hazard indicator is less reliable for the oldest individuals. I
also exclude those respondents who report to be employed or self-employed in either of the
two survey waves (around 35% of respondents aged 50  80). For this restricted sample
6This paper uses data from SHARE release 2.3.1, as of July 29th 2010. SHARE data collection
in 2004-2007 was primarily funded by the European Commission through its 5th and 6th framework
programmes (project numbers QLK6-CT-2001- 00360; RII-CT- 2006-062193; CIT5-CT-2005-028857).
Additional funding by the US National Institute on Aging (grant numbers U01 AG09740-13S2; P01
AG005842; P01 AG08291; P30 AG12815; Y1-AG-4553-01; OGHA 04-064; R21 AG025169) as well as by
various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see http://www.share-project.org for a full list of
funding institutions).
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the assumption of annuity type income is more reasonable. The following statistics and
results refer to the restricted estimation sample, however, in Section 5 I present robustness
checks with respect to the age and employment restrictions.
3.1 Variables used
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
The number of observations varies due to item nonresponse. The nancial variables
are purchasing parity adjusted annual amounts, deated to year 2005 Euros. These
variables are generated as the mean of the ve imputed values provided in the SHARE
database. The household level consumption, income and wealth measures are scaled by
the household size. In this scaling I assign a value of 1 to the rst household member,
and 0.7 to each of the further household members.
- Table 1 about here -
Consumption is measured by annual expenditure on food at home and outside home.7
Outlying consumption values are excluded from the empirical analysis, where an obser-
vation is dened to be outlier if the absolute value of the rst di¤erenced consumption
is larger than 5 thousand EUR (3% of the observations). Measuring consumption by
expenditures on food is a data limitation since the second wave of SHARE does not
provide panel data on overall or other categories of consumption expenditures.8 The
7The wording of the question is the following: "Thinking about the last 12 months: about how much
did your household spend in a typical month on food to be consumed at/outside home?" This amount
is multiplied by 12 to generate the annual amount.
8Alternatively, the empirical analysis could also be based on the HRS merged with the Consumption
and Activities Mail Survey. These data include subjective survival probability measures and more general
consumption measures, as well. However, the identication strategy applied here does not work with
these alternative data. Based on the Rand HRS data le (version L, waves 5-10), the death of a sibling
does not have signicant e¤ect on the rst di¤erenced subjective hazard, and its e¤ect on the binary
indicator of hazard shock is positive but small with a p-value of 0.08. This di¤erence from the SHARE
ndings can be due to more severe measurement errors, di¤erent reporting styles, or less tight family
relationships among siblings.
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food expenditure indicator can serve as a proxy for overall consumption expenditures,
and measures of expenditure on food can be relatively reliable. If the utility func-
tion is additively separable in food and other consumption goods then the results of
the life-cycle model of consumption are valid for food consumption. Additive sepa-
rability is assumed by Zeldes (1989) when testing the permanent income hypothesis.
Browning and Lusardi (1996) provide a literature overview of Euler equation consump-
tion studies, and document that using food consumption data is widespread in the litera-
ture. On the other hand, Mork and Smith (1989) and Attanasio and Weber (1995) pro-
vide evidence that food consumption might not be an adequate measure when analysing
the sensitivity of consumption to income, or when estimating the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. The main concern is that as food consumption is a necessity, ex-
penditures on food are likely to be more stable than on other consumption categories.
This implies that the estimation results in this paper might be biased towards zero - the
adjustment of total consumption expenditures after a hazard shock is likely to be larger
than the adjustment of expenditures on food.
The indicators of new chronic diseases are binary variables which equal one if the
individual reports having heart attack, stroke, hip fracture or the diagnosis of high blood
pressure, cancer, diabetes, high blood cholesterol since the rst interview. Two additional
health measures are limitations with activities of daily living (ADL), and whether the
respondent su¤ers from depression. The becoming single indicator is set to one if the
respondent was married and living together with the spouse in the rst wave, but his
marital status is widowed, divorced or married but living separated from the spouse in
the second wave.
The variable of central interest is the subjective survival probability. The wording of
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the survival probability question is "What are the chances that you will live to be age
[target age] or more?", where the target age depends on the age of the respondent (with
values between 75  110).
In Table 1 I also include some descriptive statistics on the number of siblings and
death of siblings, as the instrumenting strategy is based on these variables.
3.2 Measuring subjective hazard
The reported survival probability can change between the two waves not only if the
subjective remaining life expectancy changes, but also if the target age in the probability
question changes. Therefore the reported probabilities should be adjusted.
I adjust the reported probability so that for each individual it represents the subjective
probability of living at least two years more. I do not make any further adjustment,
assuming that the reported probability includes all the available information about the
subjective survival beliefs. I apply a similar adjustment method as Salm (2010). The
adjustment procedure is based on the hazard-scaling approach of Gan et al. (2005), which
also corresponds to the assumptions made in the life-cycle model of Section 2. The rst
step is to derive the individual specic index of pessimism:
i =
ln st+ait
lnSt+at
; (12)
where t is the current age, t+ a is the target age, s is the subjective survival probability,
and S is the life table survival probability. I use the WHO life tables for year 2006, which
are gender and country specic life tables.9
9Source: http://apps.who.int/whosis/database/life_tables/life_tables.cfm. These are period (or cur-
rent), and not cohort life tables. Period life tables might underestimate the survival probabilities to old
ages. Since the life tables are used only for adjusting the reported probabilities, using period life tables
does not cause bias in the estimates.
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The 2-year subjective survival probability of individual i is calculated the following
way:
st+2it =
 
St+2t
i ; (13)
and the 2-year cumulative hazard is
ht+2it =  i lnSt+2t : (14)
The 2-year di¤erence between the target and current age is specied because two years
elapse between the rst and second survey waves.
5:5% of the respondents of the estimation sample report 0% survival probability in
either the rst or second wave survey, for whom the pessimism index and mortality
hazard cannot be calculated. When estimating the consumption models I exclude those
respondents for whom the subjective hazard is missing, but in Section 5.1 I analyse the
sensitivity of the results to this exclusion.
- Figure 1 about here -
The histograms of the reported and generated survival probabilities for the estimation
sample (aged 50-80, retired) are presented in Figure 1, where the assumption is used that
the 0% reported probability corresponds to 0:5% true probability. The adjusted survival
probability is more skewed to the right than the original one because it refers to 2-year
survival probability, whereas the mean of the di¤erence between the current and target age
is 13:5. The histogram of the reported survival probabilities shows the problem of focal
responses (0, 50 or 100 percentage reported probabilities), which indicates measurement
error.
Based on the WHO life tables the survival probabilities can be determined only for 5-year age ranges.
In order to calculate the survival probability to any age I make the simplifying assumption that the
number of people alive from a given cohort declines linearly within the given 5-year intervals.
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- Figure 2 about here -
Figure 2 depicts the median of the subjective and life table 2-year survival probabilities
by age for the retired individuals. It indicates that the reported probabilities t the
life table probabilities relatively well, and the 2-year survival probabilities are close to
one, especially at younger ages. However, people tend to overestimate their survival
probability at older ages, whereas there is slight underestimation at younger ages.
In Table 2 I present the estimated coe¢ cients of three OLSmodels. These models show
how the subjective hazard indicators correspond to the death of relatives, to the parents
longevity, and to other individual specic characteristics. As there are no endogeneity
concerns in these models (reverse causality is not likely and the measurement errors
in the dependent variables can be assumed to be independent of the regressors), OLS
specication is appropriate. In the rst part of the table I use two indicators of increasing
hazard: the rst di¤erenced adjusted hazard ("di¤. hazard"), and a binary indicator of an
at least 1:5 percentage points drop in the adjusted subjective survival probability between
the rst and second waves of the survey. The binary indicator of increasing hazard equals
one for 33% of the respondents in the estimation sample. In the second part of the table
the dependent variable is the rst wave adjusted hazard. The signicance levels are based
on clustered standard errors, with clustering on the household level.
- Table 2 about here -
My focus is on the indicators of the death of a sibling between the two survey waves,
and the death of all siblings before wave one. For 12% of the respondents in the estimation
sample the number of siblings alive decreases between the two waves, and the observed
decrease is less than three. The change in the number of siblings alive is a noisy measure,
therefore I consider as noise the di¤erences higher than three. The level of rst wave
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hazard is regressed among others on a binary variable which equals one if the respondent
has no siblings alive in wave one, but reports that he had siblings before (6% of the
respondents in the estimation sample).
Based on these estimations the respondents update their survival probabilities if a
sibling dies. The estimation results imply that for a 60 year old representative man the
expected remaining lifetime decreases by around 2:7 years after the death of a sibling,
ceteris paribus. The estimation results also indicate that if the respondent had siblings
but all of them are dead by wave one then the subjective mortality hazard is signicantly
higher.10
The presented results are in line with the ndings of Hurd and McGarry (1995) and
Hamermesh (1985): the observed health problems have positive e¤ect on the measure of
subjective hazard, and the subjective hazard depends on the longevity of the relatives.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Empirical specication
In this paper I analyse how the hazard level and increasing mortality hazard a¤ect the
consumption expenditures of older individuals. The estimated models are equations (10)
and (11). I use two indicators of increasing hazard: the rst di¤erenced adjusted hazard,
and a binary indicator of an at least 1:5 percentage points drop in the adjusted two-year
subjective survival probability between the rst and second waves of the survey. As the
10The rest of the included regressors have mostly the expected sign. Due to measurement errors (as
also reected by the focal responses), the estimation results of the models of changing hazard are noisier
than the results of the hazard level model, and the explanatory power of the regressions is small. There
are some unexpected results, e.g. the negative coe¢ cient of a new diagnosis with diabetes. The negative
sign can be due to changing health behavior after the diagnosis (e.g. healthier diet), but can be also
caused by measurement errors among the 300 newly diagnosed respondents.
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cuto¤ value of 1:5 in the increasing hazard indicator is selected arbitrarily, I present in
Section 5.2 some robustness checks with respect to this value. The Xi vector includes
indicators of individual-specic preferences or changes in preferences. These variables are
age, age squared, gender, having children, rst di¤erenced logarithmic income, indica-
tors of being diagnosed with chronic diseases since the rst wave, ADL limitation and
depression, becoming single, and country dummies. I also include the death of the father
or mother as explanatory variables since such an event might inuence the consumption
expenditures e.g. through bequests.
Unobserved shocks (e.g. unobserved changes in health status or macroeconomic
shocks) can a¤ect not only the consumption dynamics but also the reported survival
probability, making the rst di¤erenced hazard endogenous in the model. In addition,
the subjective survival probability is measured with error, as a consequence, the hazard
indicators are also measured with error. If the measurement error is correlated with the
observed hazard values then the OLS estimator is biased. These endogeneity concerns
call for the application of the method of instrumental variables. The key assumption
needed for the validity of the applied instrumenting method is that the instruments used
(indicators of a siblings death) are independent from the error term of the consumption
model (which consists of the unobservables and the measurement error).
4.2 First stage results
The death of a sibling between the two survey waves is used as instrument for the rst
di¤erenced hazard and for the binary indicator of increasing hazard. Even if the death of
a sibling might have been expected (e.g. due to long lasting illness), this event causes an
exogenous shock to the subjective survival probability. It a¤ects the subjective hazard,
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and the death of a sibling is unlikely to have direct e¤ect on food consumption expen-
ditures at older ages. The latter might not be true for the parents or the children of
the respondent. Table 2 also shows that the e¤ect of the death of a parent on the rst
di¤erenced hazard is insignicant and smaller than the e¤ect of the death of a sibling.
The level of rst wave hazard is instrumented by a binary variable which equals one if
the respondent has no siblings alive in wave one, but reports that he had siblings before.
Using binary instruments does not violate the consistency of the IV estimator. I discuss
some potential endogeneity concerns in Section 4.4.11
Bloom et al. (2007) apply a di¤erent instrumenting strategy: they instrument the
subjective survival probability with the age or age of death of the parents, using HRS
data. However, as the parents and their children are likely to share some consumption
expenditures, their age or age at death is more likely to directly a¤ect the consumption
expenditures, thus might not be a valid instrument in the consumption model. Neverthe-
less, as a specication test I re-estimate my models applying the instruments of Bloom
et al. in Section 5.3.
In Table 3 I present the coe¢ cients of the instruments from the rst stage of the
consumption model. This table refers to the specication of equation (10), where the
di¤erenced hazard is a regressor. First I estimate the model for the whole retired popula-
tion aged 50  80, then I restrict the sample to those who have positive wealth holdings,
according to the net worth indicator. I present the estimation results with no additional
controls, then including age and age squared as controls, and nally including all control
variables listed above. I present also the value of the F-test, where the null hypothesis is
that the two instruments are jointly insignicant.
11The instrumental variable models are estimated and tested by the ivreg2 command of Stata, as
provided by Baum et al. (2007).
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- Table 3 about here -
Table 4 presents the selected rst stage coe¢ cients from the model of equation (11).
- Table 4 about here -
The results show that under all specications the death of a sibling between the two
survey waves increases the subjective hazard, and the subjective hazard in the rst wave
is signicantly higher if all the siblings of the respondent have died by that time. The
magnitude and the signicance of these e¤ects are not a¤ected by restricting the sample
to the wealthy individuals. The instruments are generally weaker if additional controls
are included in the consumption models.
4.3 Second stage results
I estimate the consumption models on the whole applicable sample and also on the sample
of individuals with positive wealth holdings. The theory predicts that the consumption
expenditures of wealthy individuals are more responsive to the hazard shocks. Due to the
endogeneity concerns I apply the method of IV estimation. For the sake of comparison I
reestimate the models with OLS.
In the rst set of specications I include the di¤erenced hazard as a measure of
increasing hazard (equation (10)). The estimated coe¢ cients of interest are presented
in Table 5. The estimations are repeated with the dummy variable of increasing hazard
included as a regressor (equation (11)). The estimated coe¢ cients of interest based on
this specication are reported in Table 6. The explanatory power of the consumption
models is small, due to the noisy measure of rst di¤erenced consumption expenditures.
- Table 5 about here -
If the di¤erenced hazard is included as regressor in the consumption model (Table
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5) then the expected positive e¤ect of this indicator cannot be seen based on the OLS
estimates. Based on the IV estimation results the partial e¤ect of the di¤erenced hazard
on consumption expenditures is positive, but this e¤ect is signicant at 5% level only
for those who are not credit constrained. This is in line with the life cycle model: if
someone lives only from the annuity type income then the consumption is una¤ected by
the subjective mortality hazard. The results suggest that the ex post e¤ect of subjective
hazard on consumption expenditures is stronger than the ex ante e¤ect. The estimated
e¤ects of the hazard measures are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of the additional
control variables.
- Table 6 about here -
According to the implications of the life-cycle model, increasing mortality hazard
indicated by a drop in the survival probability should lead to increased consumption
expenditures. The estimation results show the expected sign of this e¤ect if the indicator
of increasing hazard is instrumented, but the e¤ect is signicant only at 10% signicance
level once age is controlled for (Table 6).
Based on the presented results it is clear that using instrumental variables when
estimating the e¤ect of subjective hazard on consumption is important. The smaller
magnitude of the OLS estimates can be due to omitted variable bias (e.g. unobserved
health shocks increasing subjective hazard but decreasing consumption expenditures),
and can also be due to measurement errors (attenuation bias). Since the probability of the
death of a sibling increases with the respondents age, and age can have direct (possibly
nonlinear) e¤ect on consumption decisions, in the preferred IV specication I control for
age and age squared. Omitting the other control variables is also reasonable since those
are generally insignicant under the second stage.12 The preferred specications indicate
12I present in the Appendix the detailed IV estimation results, restricting the sample to those with
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that the consumption path is inuenced by the hazard shocks.
The magnitude of the estimated e¤ect of a hazard shock is not negligible. Around the
median expenditure, if the logarithmic value of food consumption expenditures decreases
or increases by 0:6 due to a large shock in expected longevity then that is equivalent to
110  200 EUR change in the individual monthly food expenditures.13
For a 60 year old man a 1:5 percentage points decrease in the two-year survival
probability is approximately equivalent to 4 years decrease in the expected remaining
lifetime (from 21 years to 17 years), and to 0:02 increase in the two-year subjective
hazard.14 The increasing hazard can be partly due to ageing, but is also due to the
arrival of new information. Based on the IV results presented in the middle part of Table
5, such a decrease in the expected longevity leads to around 270 EUR increase in the
annual expenditure on food at the median, ceteris paribus, if the wealth holdings are
not zero. This corresponds to an adjustment of around 9%. The model extended with
additional controls predict a higher increasing e¤ect, around 300 EUR. If the two-year
subjective hazard increases by the same amount in addition to the increase due to ageing
then the estimated adjustment in consumption expenditures is even higher.
The estimated coe¢ cient of the rst wave hazard is negative both under the OLS and
IV estimates, but its magnitude is sensitive to the estimation method and to the included
indicator of hazard shock. The negative sign is in line with the Euler equation: people
with higher mortality hazard allocate more consumption expenditures to the present and
positive wealth. I test the joint signicance of the control variables other then the hazard and age
indicators. The p-value of the Chi-squared statistic is 0.61 (if the di¤erenced hazard is included) and
0.37 (if the binary indicator of increasing hazard is included).
13The estimated e¤ect of increasing hazard is a "local average treatment e¤ect" if there is a systematic
di¤erence between those who update their expectations after a siblings death and those who do not.
In this paper I use the simplifying assumption that the e¤ect of a hazard shock on the logarithmic
consumption expenditures is constant across the analysed population.
14These calculations are based on the German life table. It is assumed that before the hazard shock
the subjective survival probability of this individual was equal to the life table survival probability.
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less to the future. The estimated coe¢ cient of the initial hazard under the IV estimation
is between  1:066 and  5:251. This implies that if a 60 year old man had initially
median food expenditures but 1 percentage point lower two-year survival probability than
a similar man with life-table survival probability then the man with the lower survival
probability is expected to allocate 30   160 EUR less expenditure on food to the next
observed period (i.e. the second next year), ceteris paribus. However, these estimated
e¤ects are statistically not signicant.
4.4 Endogeneity concerns
The validity of the instrumenting strategy is violated if the death of a sibling has direct
e¤ect on the consumption expenditures.
The consumption measure might be directly a¤ected by the death of the sibling if
the sibling lived in the same household as the respondent. Therefore I reestimate the
consumption models with excluding from the estimation sample the respondents whose
household size changed between the two waves (14% of the sample). I also reestimate
the models with excluding those individuals who report receiving gift or inheritance of
5 thousand EUR or more since the rst wave, and for whom it can be identied that it
was received from a sibling (less than 0:3% of the sample). Neither of these restrictions
inuences the estimated sign of the indicators of changing subjective hazard, and the size
of the estimated e¤ect is qualitatively una¤ected.
Another concern can be that the expected inheritance from parents might increase
after the death of a sibling. If this is the case then such increase in expected income can
cause the adjustment of consumption expenditures. However, the data do not provide
any evidence for this hypothesis. Even if the sample is restricted to those who have a
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parent alive (14% of the estimation sample), the death of a sibling has no signicant
e¤ect on the reported probabilities of receiving any inheritance or inheritance above
50 thousand EUR within the next ten years. Based on this subsample the estimated
increase in the probability of receiving inheritance after a siblings death is not only
statistically insignicant but also of relatively small magnitude, 0:5 percentage points for
any inheritance, and 2:2 percentage points for large inheritance. These results indicate
that the positive e¤ect of a hazard shock on consumption expenditures is not driven by
a direct inuence of the death of the sibling on the consumption expenditures.
If the consumption preferences change after the death of a sibling then that can also
violate the exogeneity of the instrument. In two related studies Elder (2007) nds some
evidence that subjective longevity increases the risk tolerance of the HRS respondents,
and Finkelstein et al. (2008) provide evidence that the marginal utility of consumption
increases with health.
In this paper consumption is measured by the expenditure on food consumed at and
away from home. If the two categories of food expenditures are adjusted di¤erently after
the hazard shock then that can indicate that the preferences change either with the death
of a sibling or with the hazard shock. Based on the available data it is not possible to
distinguish these two inuencing mechanisms from each other. For the sake of analysing
how the preferences change after the death of a sibling, I reestimate the consumption
model with using the expenditure on food consumed at home as consumption measure.
The average share of expenditures on food consumed at home within the total food
expenditures is 89% in the sample. Table 7 presents the estimated hazard coe¢ cients
if the di¤erenced logarithmic value of expenditure on food consumed at home is the
dependent variable. In these models I include age and age squared as control variables,
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and IV estimation is applied. The expenditure on food consumed at home is estimated
to be adjusted upwards after the hazard shock slightly more than the total expenditure.
- Table 7 about here -
Thus the estimated positive e¤ect of an upward hazard shock on consumption ex-
penditures is driven by the e¤ect on the expenditure on food consumed at home. The
adjustment can take place both through quality and quantity (e.g. so as to facilitate the
invitation of guests). However, as the estimated e¤ect of a hazard shock is close to the
benchmark result, and the standard errors of the coe¢ cient estimates are relatively large,
there is no clear statistical evidence for a change in consumption preferences.
4.5 Selectivity
If the sample is nonrandom then that can potentially cause bias in the estimated coe¢ -
cients. As documented by Borsch-Supan et al. (2008), the attrition rate between the rst
two waves of the survey is 31:7%. The majority of the attrition is not due to death, only
2:6% of wave one respondents deceased between the two waves. Attrition is more likely
for individuals with higher subjective mortality hazard in the rst wave of the sample.
The nonresponse rate to subjective survival probability in the estimating sample is
relatively high, around 9%. The item nonresponse rate varies across the countries, it
is the highest in France (20%), the lowest in Austria (4%), based on both waves of the
survey, excluding the respondents aged above 80 and those who are still working. A
probit model of item nonresponse indicates that the probability of not answering the
survival probability question is higher for those who are older and who report worse
health status.15
15The indicator of noresponse is set to one if the di¤erenced survival probability is missing. The
control variables besides the country dummies are age, age squared, gender, marital status, education
level, income, and self reported health status. I also control for the interviewers observation of declining
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If the selection into the sample is related to the instruments, and if the consumption
dynamics are systematically di¤erent between the included and missing observations then
the IV estimates are biased. Observations on the consumption decisions near the end of
life are likely to be missing. Thus the e¤ect of increasing mortality hazard indicator
is underestimated if consumption becomes more responsive to the hazard near the end
of life. This can be the case if the uncertainty in survival probability decreases with
approaching the end of life. On the other hand, the e¤ects are overestimated if the
marginal utility of consumption approaches zero before death.
The estimated e¤ect of an upward hazard shock is stronger if the rst wave hazard
was above the median hazard. This result suggests that the e¤ect of a hazard shock is
likely to be underestimated due to attrition and item nonresponse among respondents
with higher rst wave mortality hazard.
5 Robustness and specication checks
5.1 Estimation sample
In the following robustness and specication checks the sample is restricted to retired
individuals with positive wealth holdings, and only the IV estimates are analysed. In
Table 8 I present the results of the IV estimations where age and age squared are controlled
for. The rst row includes the reference results from Section 4.3.
As the rst robustness check, I reestimate the models with including in the sample
those who are aged above 80 but not more than 90: The magnitude of the estimated
coe¢ cients are strongly a¤ected by the age restriction. One explanation for the sensitivity
willingness to answer during the interview. This is reasonable since the expectation questions are in the
nal block of the SHARE questionnaire.
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of the coe¢ cients is the di¤erent explanatory power of the instruments: the e¤ect of the
death of all siblings on the rst wave hazard becomes stronger, whereas the e¤ect of the
death of a sibling on the hazard shock indicators become weaker with the inclusion of
the oldest respondents. A second explanation can be that people aged above 80 are less
likely to adjust their consumption expenditures after an upward shock in the subjective
hazard, which is reected by the insignicant and small coe¢ cients of the indicators of
changing hazard.
- Table 8 about here -
In the benchmark specications the hazard indicators are missing if the reported
survival probability is zero (5:5% of the estimation sample). Due to rounding the zero
reported probability might correspond to very low but nonzero true subjective survival
probability. I reestimate the models using the assumption that the reported zero probabil-
ity corresponds to 0:5% survival probability to the target age. The sign of the estimated
adjustment after a hazard shock is una¤ected by this modication. The estimated e¤ect
of the di¤erenced hazard becomes weaker, whereas that of the binary indicator of in-
creasing hazard becomes stronger. These ndings suggest that the observed zero survival
probabilities are due to measurement error, to which the di¤erenced hazard measure is
more sensitive than the binary indicator of increasing hazard.
In the third robustness check I repeat the benchmark specication with the di¤erence
that the individuals with positive wealth are selected not based on the net worth but on
the nancial wealth measure. If the non-nancial wealth is illiquid and cannot be used
for nancing consumption needs then the credit constraint can become binding also for
those who report positive net worth but zero nancial wealth holdings. The coe¢ cients
reported in Table 8 indicate that the estimated e¤ect of a hazard shock is qualitatively
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robust to the choice of wealth category.
The presented checks indicate that it is a robust nding that consumption expendi-
tures are adjusted upwards if the subjective hazard increases. This adjustment is much
weaker for the oldest individuals. The negative coe¢ cient of the rst wave hazard is also
a robust nding.
5.2 Cuto¤ values of increasing hazard
In this paper I set the binary indicator of increasing hazard to one if the two-year survival
probability drops at least by 1.5 percentage points between the rst two waves of the
survey. Here I analyse the sensitivity of the estimation results with respect to this cuto¤
value. First I reestimate the preferred IV model with using the cuto¤value of 1 percentage
point decrease, then with a cuto¤ value of 2. In the rst case the indicator of increasing
hazard equals one for 38% of the respondents in the estimating sample, in the second
case this ratio is 29%. The estimated coe¢ cients of interest are reported in Table 8.
The estimated e¤ect of increasing hazard increases slightly if a higher cuto¤ value is
used. This is a reasonable nding as it shows the e¤ect of more substantial hazard shocks.
On the other hand, the statistical signicance of the estimated e¤ect becomes weaker,
which corresponds to the lower number of individuals categorised as being subject to a
hazard shock.
5.3 Instrumental variables methods
The next set of specication checks is with respect to the applied method of instrumental
variables. Since there is some evidence that the instruments are weak, it is reasonable to
compare the results with alternative estimators. Weak instruments can cause large bias
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in the nite sample two-stage least squares estimates. Hahn et al. (2004) suggest the
usage of Fullers estimator with parameters 1 or 4.16 An alternative can be the jackknife
instrumental variables estimator (JIVE), which can mitigate the nite-sample bias of
the 2SLS estimator. I apply the method suggested by Angrist et al. (1999) where the
jackknife rst stage tted value is used as instrument in the second stage IV estimation.
These results are presented in the last part of Table 8.17
It is a robust nding that the estimated e¤ect of increasing mortality hazard is positive
on consumption expenditures. The e¤ect of the hazard shock is estimated to be larger if
the jackknife instrumental variables estimator is used. The results also reinforce that the
ex ante e¤ect of subjective hazard on the consumption path is negative. However, this
e¤ect is insignicant under all specications.
Finally, I re-estimate the preferred specications with using the age or age at death of
the parents and the death of a parent between the two survey waves as instruments. These
instruments correspond to the instrumenting strategy of Bloom et al. (2007), although
their validity is questionable in the current application. The positive estimated e¤ect
of hazard shocks still hold under this alternative instrumenting strategy, although the
estimated e¤ect is no longer signicant.
These results altogether suggest that the adjustment of consumption expenditures
after a hazard shock can be reliably estimated by the preferred 2SLS estimation method.
16Fullers estimator is a member of the k-class estimators. If the structural model is Y = X + u,
then the k-class estimator is ^ = (X 0(I   kMZ)X) 1X 0(I   kMZ)Y . Here Z is the vector of rst stage
regressors, and MZ = I   PZ = I   Z (Z 0Z) 1 Z 0. The OLS estimator is obtained if k = 0, the 2SLS is
obtained if k = 1. The LIML estimator is obtained if k = , where  is the smallest eigenvalue of the
matrix W 0PZW (W 0MZW ) 1 with W = [Y;X]:
In Fullers estimator k =  a=(N  K), where N is the number of observations, and K is the number
of regressors in the rst-stage model. If a = 1 then the model is approximately unbiased, if a = 4 then
there is bias, but the mean squared error is smaller. Further details about these estimation methods are
provided by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) and Hahn et al. (2004).
17The jive command of Stata written by Poi (2006) is applied in the jackknife estimation.
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5.4 Extensions of the life-cycle model
The life-cycle consumption model derived in Section 2 is based on the assumption that
the decision makers have annuity income. The implications of the model might not
hold if income is time varying. For instance, if the credit constraint is binding for an
individual who expects increasing income then the expected consumption path can be
positively sloped. The optimal consumption path is also modied if income is uncertain.
The planned consumption path becomes atter or even positively sloped with income
uncertainty, in which case the previously derived positive e¤ect of increasing hazard
might not hold. The intuition for this result is that income uncertainty necessitates
precautionary savings, and consumption is postponed to later ages when the uncertain
income is realised.
As an indicator of time varying income I use the employment status of the respondents.
The results presented in this paper are based on the subsample of retired individuals. The
data provide evidence that the e¤ect of increasing hazard on consumption expenditures
is indeed stronger for those who are not employed. The estimated coe¢ cient of the
di¤erenced hazard becomes 4:41 (previously 5:67), and the coe¢ cient of the dummy of
increasing hazard becomes 0:47 (previously 0:60) in the preferred specications if the
employed respondents are also included in the estimation (the size of the estimation
sample after this extension is around 12:5 thousand). Both coe¢ cients are signicant at
10% signicance level, but insignicant at 5%. As in reality the retired individuals might
still be subject to income shocks (e.g. through income sources from other household
members), the main results of this paper are likely to underestimate the pure e¤ect of
mortality hazard shocks.
The presented life-cycle model also assumes that there are no bequest motives. Hurd (1989)
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and Gan et al. (2004) nd using HRS data that bequest motives are weak. If the life-cycle
model is extended with bequest motive then the model can be solved only numerically.
However, a simple two-period model indicates that the partial e¤ect of mortality hazard
on the consumption level becomes smaller with bequest motives.18
An indicator of bequest motive is whether the respondent has children or not. It can
be assumed that the bequest motives are weaker for those who do not have children.
However, only 10% of the respondents fall into this category, and due to the small sample
the consumption model coe¢ cient estimates become imprecise with t statistics close to
zero. The similar holds if the bequest motives are indicated by living in non single
households. Restricting the sample to single households would necessitate the exclusion
of 83% of the otherwise eligible observations.19
6 Concluding remarks
The life-cycle model with uncertain lifetime predicts that the e¤ect of subjective mortality
hazard on expected consumption dynamics is negative, whereas an upward shock in
mortality hazard leads to higher consumption expenditures, provided that the credit
constraint is not binding. The main novelty of this paper is to identify the inuencing
role of changing hazard on consumption expenditures. Using the rst two waves of the
18The following simplifying assumptions are made in the two-period life-cycle model. The utility of
bequest has the same functional form as that of consumption, but multiplied with an individual-specic
multiplicator (Bi). This term indicates the strength of the bequest motive. In the rst period the
individual decides on the current consumption level, and in the second period he either consumes all the
remaining wealth (if survives) or leaves bequest (if dies).
Under these assumptions the sign of the e¤ect of subjective hazard on the optimal consumption level
is the same as the sign of (1 Bi), provided that the credit constraint is not binding: Therefore the
partial e¤ect of mortality hazard is smaller if bequest motives are stronger.
19An alternative approach could be to use the reported subjective probability of leaving inharitance.
However, it is not obvious that this measure indicates bequest motives, it su¤ers from measurement errors
similarly to the subjective survival probability, and again the majority (around 75%) of the respondents
indicate positive probability.
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Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, I identify the e¤ect of the subjective
hazard by using indicators of the death of a sibling as instruments.
The empirical results conrm the implication of the life-cycle model about the e¤ect
of increasing mortality hazard. People aged 50   80, who have positive wealth holdings
are estimated to adjust their consumption expenditures after an upward hazard shock.
The magnitude of this e¤ect is not negligible, and the positive estimated e¤ect of in-
creasing mortality hazard on consumption expenditures is a robust result. The estimated
e¤ect is stronger if the employed individuals are excluded from the sample. If the e¤ect
of increasing and decreasing subjective hazard on consumption expenditures is symmet-
ric, then the estimation results also indicate that increasing expected longevity leads to
smaller consumption expenditures, hence to slower wealth decumulation. My results also
conrm that survival probabilities reported by survey respondents contain economically
relevant information about longevity expectations. The ndings about the dependence of
consumption expenditure decisions on subjective expectations are also relevant to annuiti-
sation decisions. Full annuitisation is not optimal if individuals have better information
on their expected longevity than the insurance companies have, and my results provide
evidence that subjective longevity indeed matters in economic decisions.
Some evidence is also found for the negative e¤ect of rst period mortality hazard on
the consumption dynamics, which is implied by the Euler equation of the life-cycle model.
However, this estimated ex ante e¤ect is more sensitive to the empirical specications than
the estimated adjustment after the hazard shock.
The results of this paper are based on a sample of elderly people, the e¤ect of mor-
tality hazard shocks on consumption expenditures is likely to be considerably di¤erent
at younger ages, when the mortality hazard is smaller.
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Mean Median Standard dev. Observations
consumption (1000 EUR) 3.34 2.93 2.07 33,139
gross income (1000 EUR) 21.95 13.66 113.21 33,139
net worth (1000 EUR) 181.39 97.52 545.12 33,139
survival prob. (%) 60.51 60.00 28.67 30,148
age 66.71 67.00 7.65 33,139
female 0.58 1 0.49 33,139
has children 0.90 1 0.31 33,139
nr of siblings alive 2.32 2 2.13 31,951
new chronic disease 0.21 0 0.41 10,472
become ADL limited 0.06 0 0.23 10,472
di¤erenced depression -0.01 0 0.46 10,154
become single 0.02 0 0.15 10,472
sibling dies 0.12 0 0.23 10,472
all siblings dead by wave 1 0.06 0 0.24 10,472
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, rst two waves of SHARE, retired respondents aged 50-80
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Figure 1: Histograms of the reported and adjusted survival probabilities, pooled data
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Figure 2: Median of subjective and life table 2-year survival probabilities as function of
age
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di¤. hazard increasing hazard hazard
sibling dies 0.008 0.063 all siblings dead 0.006
[3.01] [3.90] [2.13]
mother dies 0.004 0.063 age mother -0.000
[1.44] [2.40] [4.08]
father dies 0.005 0.097 age father -0.000
[1.45] [2.62] [1.80]
age -0.005 0.038 age 0.003
[2.55] [3.18] [2.35]
age squared 0.000 -0.000 age squared 0.000
[2.40] [2.42] [0.67]
female -0.005 -0.036 female -0.003
[3.57] [3.62] [2.47]
new cancer 0.022 0.150 had cancer 0.007
[2.24] [2.02] [2.40]
new heart attack 0.025 0.173 had heart attack 0.012
[1.89] [2.65] [5.66]
new stroke -0.011 -0.084 had stroke 0.008
[0.68] [0.78] [1.98]
new fracture 0.011 0.087 had hip fracture 0.004
[0.70] [0.58] [0.65]
new hypertension 0.005 0.025 had hypertension 0.003
[1.81] [1.55] [1.99]
new high cholesterol 0.002 -0.028 had high cholesterol 0.004
[0.68] [1.65] [2.38]
new diabetes -0.012 -0.047 had diabetes 0.008
[2.53] [1.81] [3.18]
di¤. ADL 0.001 0.065 ADL 0.009
[0.21] [2.82] [3.35]
di¤. depression 0.008 0.065 depression 0.013
[4.91] [5.88] [8.23]
become single 0.006 0.065 single 0.002
[1.08] [1.82] [1.17]
Constant 0.179 -1.164 Constant -0.118
[2.83] [2.94] [2.74]
Observations 8,356 8,929 Observations 8,221
R-squared 0.01 0.04 R-squared 0.14
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 2: OLS regression estimates of subjective hazard models, country dummies not
reported
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No controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard
all siblings dead 0.019 -0.004 0.020 -0.005
[6.16] [1.22] [5.97] [1.31]
sibling dies 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.009
[2.66] [3.13] [2.62] [3.07]
F 21.48 5.87 20.27 5.82
Observations 8,447 8,447 8,009 8,009
Only age and age squared as controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard
all siblings dead 0.010 -0.004 0.010 -0.005
[3.16] [1.25] [3.22] [1.34]
sibling dies 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.009
[0.08] [3.14] [0.14] [3.08]
F 5.00 5.98 5.20 5.94
Observations 8,447 8,447 8,009 8,009
With controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard wave 1 hazard di¤. hazard
all siblings dead 0.009 -0.004 0.009 -0.005
[2.87] [1.21] [2.93] [1.28]
sibling dies 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.008
[0.43] [2.89] [0.44] [2.84]
F 4.14 5.22 4.30 5.16
Observations 8,356 8,356 7,925 7,925
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 3: First stage estimation results of the consumption models, di¤erenced hazard
used as regressor
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No controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard hazard incr. wave 1 hazard hazard incr.
all siblings dead 0.020 0.029 0.020 0.026
[6.31] [1.31] [6.21] [1.16]
sibling dies 0.006 0.103 0.006 0.098
[3.12] [6.20] [2.92] [5.74]
F 23.53 19.59 22.31 16.74
Observations 8,763 8,763 8,289 8,289
Only age and age squared as controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard hazard incr. wave 1 hazard hazard incr.
all siblings dead 0.009 -0.011 0.010 -0.012
[3.10] [0.48] [3.27] [0.51]
sibling dies 0.001 0.081 0.000 0.077
[0.29] [4.86] [0.18] [4.47]
F 4.80 12.23 5.34 10.44
Observations 8,763 8,763 8,289 8,289
With controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
wave 1 hazard hazard incr. wave 1 hazard hazard incr.
all siblings dead 0.008 -0.004 0.009 -0.012
[2.74] [0.50] [2.90] [0.54]
sibling dies 0.001 0.070 0.001 0.067
[0.44] [4.19] [0.35] [3.88]
F 3.76 9.19 4.21 7.95
Observations 8,666 8,666 8,200 8,200
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 4: First stage estimation results of the consumption models, binary indicator of
increasing hazard used as regressor
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No controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
di¤erenced hazard 2.714 -0.065 5.952 -0.066
[1.06] [0.39] [2.24] [0.39]
wave 1 hazard -1.203 -0.424 -1.066 -0.425
[0.80] [1.65] [0.59] [1.62]
R2 0.001 0.001
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.001 0.001
observations 8,447 8,447 8,009 8,009
Only age and age squared as controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
di¤erenced hazard 2.412 -0.043 5.673 -0.050
[0.87] [0.26] [2.00] [0.30]
wave 1 hazard -1.680 -0.383 -1.389 -0.397
[0.48] [1.43] [0.35] [1.45]
R2 0.002 0.002
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.002 0.002
observations 8,447 8,447 8,009 8,009
With controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
di¤erenced hazard 2.893 -0.032 6.301 -0.056
[0.96] [0.20] [1.97] [0.34]
wave 1 hazard -1.946 -0.319 -1.622 -0.331
[0.51] [1.18] [0.37] [1.19]
R2 0.007 0.008
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.005 0.004
observations 8,356 8,356 7,925 7,925
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 5: Consumption model estimation results (second stage), di¤erenced hazard used
as regressor
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No controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
hazard increase 0.295 -0.008 0.648 0.007
[1.06] [0.48] [2.25] [0.44]
wave 1 hazard -2.089 -0.343 -3.992 -0.328
[1.48] [1.57] [1.91] [1.46]
R2 0.001 0.001
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.000 0.000
observations 8,763 8,763 8,289 8,289
Only age and age squared as controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
hazard increase 0.246 -0.004 0.598 0.009
[0.81] [0.27] [1.89] [0.61]
wave 1 hazard -3.583 -0.287 -4.647 -0.281
[0.96] [1.23] [1.20] [1.17]
R2 0.002 0.002
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.002 0.001
observations 8,763 8,763 8,289 8,289
With controls
Whole sample Positive wealth
IV OLS IV OLS
hazard increase 0.307 -0.004 0.693 0.007
[0.85] [0.25] [1.79] [0.47]
wave 1 hazard -4.129 -0.221 -5.251 -0.209
[0.97] [0.94] [1.16] [0.85]
R2 0.008 0.008
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.006 0.004
observations 8,666 8,666 8,200 8,200
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 6: Consumption model estimation results (second stage), binary indicator of in-
creasing hazard used as regressor
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Differenced hazard as regressor
Whole sample Positive wealth
di¤. hazard 3.174 6.591
[1.16] [2.35]
wave 1 hazard 0.324 1.230
[0.10] [0.32]
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.002 0.002
observations 8,447 8,009
Increasing hazard indicator as regressor
Whole sample Positive wealth
hazard incr. 0.317 0.703
[1.09] [2.33]
wave 1 hazard -1.722 -2.357
[0.49] [0.64]
p-value of Kleinbergen-Paap
underidentication test 0.002 0.001
observations 8,763 8,289
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 7: IV estimation results, di¤erenced logarithmic expenditure on food consumed at
home as dependent variable
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Di¤. hazard as regressor Hazard incr. as regressor
di¤. wave 1 hazard wave 1
hazard hazard obs. incr. hazard obs.
2SLS 5.673 -1.389 8,009 0.598 -4.647 8,289
[2.00] [0.35] [1.89] [1.20]
2SLS, 80+ included 0.832 -1.278 8,811 -0.030 -3.228 9,254
[0.25] [0.47] [0.08] [0.99]
2SLS, 0% probability 3.630 -1.103 8,524 0.813 -2.698 8,524
included [1.96] [0.43] [2.01] [0.96]
2SLS, positive 6.838 -1.782 6,015 0.793 -4.643 6,206
nancial wealth [1.89] [0.41] [1.54] [1.09]
Cuto¤: 1 %point decr. 0.597 -4.761 8,289
in survival probability [1.87] [1.22]
Cuto¤: 2 %points decr. 0.655 -5.709 8,289
in survival probability [1.79] [1.42]
Fuller(1) 5.383 -1.262 8,009 0.575 -4.378 8,289
[2.05] [0.35] [1.93] [1.22]
Fuller(4) 4.688 -0.985 8,009 0.514 -3.737 8,289
[2.15] [0.33] [2.02] [1.27]
JIVE 8.538 -2.710 8,009 0.709 -6.714 8,289
[1.69] [0.40] [1.64] [1.29]
Age & death of parents 4.125 1.372 7,717 0.280 0.821 7,982
as IV [0.84] [0.57] [1.06] [0.68]
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 8: Robustness checks: hazard indicator coe¢ cients in the consumption models (IV
estimation, age and age squared controlled for)
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Appendix Consumption model IV estimation results, respondents with positive wealth
With all controls Age and age squared as controls
di¤. hazard 6.301 5.673
[1.97] [2.00]
hazard incr. 0.693 0.598
[1.79] [1.89]
wave 1 hazard -1.622 -5.251 -1.389 -4.647
[0.37] [1.16] [0.35] [1.20]
age 0.058 0.027 0.056 0.029
[1.84] [0.92] [2.00] [1.07]
age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[1.79] [0.88] [1.92] [1.05]
mother dies -0.005 -0.040
[0.10] [0.72]
father dies -0.050 -0.097
[0.97] [1.49]
dln(income) 0.007 0.005
[1.35] [0.83]
female 0.019 -0.004
[0.74] [0.18]
has child 0.030 0.045
[0.90] [1.24]
new cancer -0.463 -0.336
[1.76] [1.45]
new heart attack -0.171 -0.011
[1.22] [0.08]
new stroke 0.056 0.103
[0.41] [0.83]
new fracture 0.103 0.092
[0.38] [0.26]
new hypertension -0.039 -0.028
[1.31] [0.97]
new high cholesterol 0.016 0.054
[0.49] [1.77]
new diabetes 0.013 0.008
[0.16] [0.11]
di¤. ADL 0.011 -0.026
[0.15] [0.31]
di¤. depression -0.041 -0.042
[1.27] [1.37]
become single 0.105 0.143
[1.52] [2.06]
DE -0.058 -0.007
[1.25] [0.13]
SE -0.036 -0.008
[0.72] [0.16]
NL -0.051 -0.039
[0.96] [0.68]
ES -0.047 -0.044
[0.85] [0.77]
IT -0.024 0.006
[0.51] [0.13]
FR -0.006 0.027
[0.12] [0.54]
DK -0.084 -0.058
[1.11] [0.71]
GR 0.032 0.075
[0.75] [1.27]
CH -0.090 -0.091
[1.31] [1.26]
BE -0.016 0.033
[0.33] [0.61]
Constant -2.024 -1.093 -1.895 -1.097
[1.84] [1.05] [1.98] [1.13]
Observations 7,925 8,200 8,009 8,289
Absolute value of cluster robust t statistics in brackets signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
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